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Abstract: The authors’ first challenge is to decipher the complexity of Islamic Finance 
despite the opacity of the sector. A second focal point is the agent’s agenda; in the Islamic 
Finance industry, contributors mandate intermediaries (agents) to transfer their contributions 
to social causes according to the Shariah; in principle, Islamic financial institutions must 
create value for their stakeholders by offering Shariah-compliant products and services. An 
underlying assumption of agency theory is that agents attempt to maximize their personal 
welfare and compensation, but such behaviour may not always be in the best interests of other 
stakeholders, and an analysis of the agent’s agenda can help explain how agents can fall off 
the pedestal of altruism. Relationships between Islamic banks and three key stakeholders 
(contributors, beneficiaries and regulators) are also explored via a complexity-aware 
monitoring process. Contributors provide funds to an Islamic bank (agent), and in return, the 
agent should be accountable to the contributors, but the form and degree of accountability can 
vary depending on the organization’s mission. There are many unanswered questions 
regarding the monitoring process. One objective of the article is to consider whether agents 
act in the best interests of the stakeholders. Finally, the authors explore the following 
question: Can blockchain technology and smart contracts support and enhance the 
transparency feature, which is the core underlying principle of all transactions in the Islamic 
Finance industry? A qualitative research framework was adopted because of the constraints of 
the enigmatic, secretive Islamic Finance culture. 
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1. Introduction 
To illustrate our thesis, let us begin by describing the archetype of Islamic banking opacity. 
Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd. (IBBL) was the first bank in South Asia to provide banking 
services based on Shariah compliance. In December 2016, IBBL won the Bank of the Year 
Award conferred by The Banker and Financial Times Group of London, the most sought-after 
distinction of its kind, regarded as a sort of Nobel Prize of the banking industry. Mohammad 
Abdul Mannan, Managing Director of the bank, received the award from Brian Caplen, Editor 
of ‘The Banker’, with some four hundred notables and panjandrums from senior management 
of over 120 banks across the globe attending the December 7 award ceremony. 
Barely a month later, in January 2017, intelligence officers picked up Mr Abdul Mannan 
along with IBBL’s chairman and a vice-chairman and asked for their resignations, and within 
a few hours the bank’s board had selected their replacements and overhauled the audit 
committee. Throughout the process, IBBL’s major shareholders, the Dubai Islami Bank, the 
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait Finance House, were kept in a 
state of ignorance and could only complain helplessly. The IDB was given just a few days’ 
notice of a board meeting and was not able to attend. What lay behind the enigma of the fall 
of The Banker’s heroes? Politics? Embezzlement? Shariah compliance? Nepotism? A naïve 
question: Would Smart contracts and a blockchain monitoring system have tipped off the 
majority shareholders and the London editor of The Banker to governance irregularities? 
Despite the enigmatic governance of IBBL, demand for Islamic finance appears to be strong, 
and growing: there are currently more than 300 Shariah-compliant banks across the globe, and 
they are expanding at an annual rate of 19.7%, outpacing the growth of traditional banks 
(World Finance 2017). Islamic banking industry, operating in over 75 countries, witnessed 
sustained growth that resulted in its total asset size exceeding $3trn in 2017. A recent Ernst & 
Young survey (EY 2017) showed that more than 50% of Islamic banks are currently investing 
in financial technologies (Fintech). This move to digital presents an opportunity for Islamic 
banks to address their stakeholders’ questions regarding the complexity, and transparency, of 
the banks’ operations. 
2. Purpose statement 
The article’s first challenge is to encapsulate key elements of the complexity of Islamic 
financial institutions, despite the opacity of the sector. A second focal point, the analysis of 
the agent’s agenda, is intended to help demystify agents’ behaviour and explain how they can 
easily fall off the pedestal of altruism. In the Islamic banking industry, contributors mandate 
intermediaries (agents) to transfer their contributions to social causes according to the 
Shariah. An underlying assumption of agency theory is that agents attempt to maximize their 
personal welfare and compensation; this behaviour may not always be in the best interests of 
other stakeholders. 
Concepts drawn from complexity theory could offer new ways to monitor the governance of 
Islamic banks. A new version of Stacey’s complexity diagram plots issues according to the 
level of agreement there is among stakeholders about the solution to social problem versus the 
amount of certainty there is that a given intervention will have the desired result. If there is a 
high level of agreement and a lot of certainty about an issue, the problems are simple, i.e., a 
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right answer exists.  When we move away from certainty and agreement, the issues become 
political, complex and even chaotic; ethical and socio-economic problems usually lie in the 
zone of complexity or chaos. In the article, the complex relationship between agents and three 
key stakeholders (contributors, beneficiaries and regulators) is explored via a complexity-
aware monitoring process. Contributors provide funds to an Islamic bank (agent), and in 
return, the agent should be accountable to the contributors and shareholders, but the form and 
degree of accountability can vary depending on the mission of the organization. There are 
many unanswered questions regarding the monitoring process; one objective is to observe 
whether the agent acts in the best interests of the stakeholders.  The biggest challenge for the 
future is the measurement of socio-economic return on investment of an agent’s interventions.  
A critical question: Who is accountable for the traceability of funds and the socio-economic 
return on investment? 
3. Research methodology 
Academic knowledge on Islamic Finance continues to be relatively limited, and we agree with 
Mintzberg (1979: 80), who states that:  “It seems far more important to research important 
topics with soft methodologies than marginal topics with elegant methodologies… most of the 
real insight has come from studies that used soft methodologies.” We selected the qualitative 
approach and phenomenological studies because of the constraints of the enigmatic, secretive 
Islamic banking culture. From a methodological point of view, it is feasible to use a 
combination of exploratory and descriptive research to satisfy our objectives. Such a 
multifaceted approach can, in many cases, transform a routine piece of research into an 
outstanding one.  Cases studies and exploratory research is most useful in the preliminary 
stages of a research project, when there is a lack of organizational transparency, especially 
when subsidiaries are invisible in the Bailiwicks of Jersey and Guernsey. This type of 
research provides a high degree of flexibility and a minimal amount of formal structure, the 
aim here being to map out the boundaries of the Islamic Finance environment around the 
world. 
4. Terms and definitions 
Governance – Refers to the systems by which organizations are directed, controlled and 
accountable (Cornforth 2003).  The term ‘accountability of an agent’ involves a transfer of 
information in the sense that the agent is answerable to someone else. (Hyndman and 
McDonnel 2009) 
Agency theory – Theory exploring the relationship between principals and agents in 
business. Agency theory is concerned with resolving problems that can exist in agency 
relationships due to unaligned goals or different aversion levels to risk. (Lacasse and Lambert 
2016a) 
Altruism – Described by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as unselfish regard for or devotion 
to the welfare of others. In contrast, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines egoists 
as persons having but one ultimate aim: their own welfare. Donors and agents can have an 
impurely altruistic behaviour; alternatively, they might give in to the temptation to act 
selfishly, and have an impurely selfish behaviour. (Andreoni 1989; Saito 2013) 
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Islamic banking – According to the Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance, Islamic 
banking refers to a system of banking or banking activity that is consistent with the principles 
of the Shariah, which prohibits the payment or acceptance of interest charges (riba) for the 
lending and accepting of money, as well as trade and other activities that provide goods or 
services considered contrary to its principles. The emphasis is on asset-backed financing 
transactions in contrast to the conventional money lending system. 
Shariah-compliant – Describes a financial product or activity that complies with the 
requirements of the Shariah. Islamic finance derives its principles from the Shariah, which is 
based on the Qur’an and the Sunnah. The key defining characteristics in the application of 
Shariah to financing structures are that transactions should be based on tangible assets, and 
should not bear interest (riba). Shariah principles also forbid uncertainty (gharar), speculation 
or excessive uncertainty (maysir) and gambling (qimar), and well as activities in certain 
prohibited areas. 
Blockchain technology – Incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions that can be 
programmed to record not just financial transactions but virtually everything of value. 
(Lacasse and Lambert 2017) 
Smart contracts – A set of promises, specified in digital form, including protocols within 
which the parties perform on those promises. Szabo’s 1994 description was as follows: “A 
smart contract is a computerised transaction protocol that executes the terms of a contract. 
The general objectives are to satisfy common contractual conditions (such as payment terms, 
liens, confidentiality, and even enforcement), minimise exceptions both malicious and 
accidental, and minimise the need for trusted intermediaries. Related economic goals include 
lowering fraud loss, arbitrations and enforcement costs, and other transaction costs.” 
5. Cogitations on agency theory  
The principal-agent relationship is defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as ‘a contract 
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent’.  In a company, the board of directors represents the principals and the 
chief executive officer is the agent.  In the Islamic banking sector, contributors mandate an 
intermediary (the agent) to transfer their funds toward Shariah-compliant financial solutions 
and services. From an agency theory perspective, the role of the principal, or governing board, 
is to monitor the chief executive officer in order to ensure that financial resources are directed 
toward the beneficiaries or users rather than diverted toward management’s interests and 
comfort. The underlying assumption of agency theory is that agents attempt to maximize their 
personal welfare. These actions may not always be in the best interests of contributors or 
beneficiaries. One aspect of our exploratory study is concerned with the complex relationship 
between the principal and the agent (Hyndman and McDonnel 2009). Traditionally, 
contributors mandate an agent to forward funds to beneficiaries and users, with a regulator 
monitoring the process, as indicated in Figure 1.  A dilemma arises when the two parties have 
different interests and asymmetric information, such that contributors or shareholders cannot 
directly ensure that the agent is always acting in their best interests, particularly when 
activities that are useful to the beneficiaries are costly for the agent, or where elements of the 
agent’s activities are costly or complex for the contributors or shareholders to observe 
(Hyndman and McDonnell 2009). This type of situation seems evident in the case of the 
award-winning Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd. 
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6. Islamic banking institutions, complex organizations 
Concepts drawn from complexity theories offer new approaches to monitoring the behaviour 
of complex organizations.  The Stacey diagram (1996) plots issues according to the level of 
agreement among stakeholders about the solution to a problem versus the degree of certainty 
that a given intervention will have the desired result.  If there is a high degree of both 
agreement and certainty about an issue, the problems are simple, i.e., a right answer exists.  
Moving away from certainty and agreement, the issues become political, complicated and 
even chaotic. The problems of beneficiaries are usually in the zone of complexity or chaos. 
Since 2000, Professor Ralph Stacey has taken a different course, moving away from 
organizations as systems toward patterns of interpersonal relationships, both good and bad 
(complex processes of interactions, power relations, ideologies, choices and intentions).  
What emerges is the uncertainty and unpredictability of human life.  As an advisor to the 
FinTechLab.ca research team on the utility of our complexity matrix, Professor Stacey had 
the following comments in 2013: “I suppose the diagram could be useful depending on just 
how it would be used.  I have more sympathy for instruments like the diagram being used 
retrospectively to analyse what happened than I am to their use for deciding what to do in the 
future.”  
As shown in Figure 2, the horizontal axis of the Stacey diagram indicates movement from 
situations close to certainty to situations far from certainty, while the vertical axis indicates 
movement from situations in which people are close to agreement with each other to 
situations in which they are far from agreement with each other. In conditions close to 
certainty and agreement, it is possible and useful to use the standard monitoring tools.  In 
intermediate situations ‘close to certainty but where there is a high degree of disagreement’ or 
in conditions ‘close to agreement but some way away from certainty’, innovative monitoring 
techniques are required (Britt 2013). In conditions ‘very far from certainty and agreement’ 
(chaos, anarchy and misbehaviour), standard monitoring tools and techniques cannot be used, 
as complex aspects of a situation cannot be known ahead of time. In general, the socio-
economic impacts of Islamic banking interventions tend to contain a mix of complicated and 
complex aspects. These cause-effect relationships only emerge retrospectively, and 
monitoring becomes a significant challenge (Lacasse and Lambert 2016b). 
7. Cracking the code of an Islamic bank business model  
The eradication of poverty, socio-economic justice, fair distribution of wealth and 
transparency are among Islam’s most pressing objectives, and according to Chapra (1997), the 
Islamic financial system must work towards achieving them. Chapra explains that the 
objectives of the Islamic financial system must be based on spiritual values and human 
brotherhood. They must work together with the aims of the Shariah, maqasid, as defined by 
Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (1058-1111). The very objective of the Shariah is to promote the 
well-being of the people, which lies in safeguarding their faith (deen), their souls (nafs), their 
intellect (aql), their posterity (nasl), and their wealth (mal). Whatever ensures the 
safeguarding of these five elements serves the public interest and is desirable, and 
whatever hurts them is against the public interest and its removal is desirable. Chapra 
highlights the interaction and codependency that exist between these five maqasid objectives, 
which from an Islamic standpoint are the rules for societies to follow if they are to become 
prosperous and socially responsible.  
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Economic growth and the increase of material wealth are entirely compatible with the Islamic 
worldview. However, the search for greater material wealth must be aligned with Islamic 
ethics and consistent with both the norms of the Shariah and the ultimate ends of the Islamic 
maqasid (Chapra, 2000 and Saadallah, 2012). The Islamic financial system must conform to 
those ultimate ends. Khan (1997) explains that for a financial system to be properly Islamic, it 
must “take care of those who cannot be supported by the market, those who cannot face 
economic forces, and those who do not have access to the financial means that would allow 
them to make the best out of the economic opportunities that exist around them” (Khan, 1997, 
p. 12-13). In theory, Islamic banks were created to meet those ends. They were defined at the 
1979 Congress of Islamic Banks, organized by the International Association of Islamic 
Banks, as follows: “The Islamic bank is a financial institution that raises funds and uses them 
in accordance with the Islamic Sharia, in order to establish a supportive society and to work 
towards the fair distribution of wealth.”  
Islamic banking is dependent upon a number of rules that include prohibitions against Riba 
(interest), Maysir (uncertainty), Gharar (speculation), and Haram (illicit activities). Islamic 
banking cannot, however, be summed up by such prohibitions. Islam puts forward a financial 
system that is based on such principles as profit-sharing but also loss-sharing; tangibility 
through asset backing; transparency through the prohibition of uncertainty; merit and utility 
through the creation of added value; and ethics. (Amzi and Berrachid 2013) 
8. Towards an effective monitoring process 
There are a number of avenues that the Islamic Finance industry could take to improve the 
monitoring of the complex relationship between the agent (managers of Islamic banks) and its 
three key stakeholders (contributors, beneficiaries and regulators).  Blockchain technology 
and smart contracts, for instance, could be harnessed to that end. As Nida Khan (2017) states, 
“Blockchain is a technological evolution that can support and enhance the transparency 
feature, which is the core underlying principle of all transactions in the Islamic Finance 
industry.” Smart contracts are coded contracts within the blockchain platform employed by an 
organization. The computer code in a smart contract removes all the sources of ambiguity that 
can be found in textual contractual documents. Once the smart contract is deployed in the 
blockchain there can be no further modifications to the code, leading to irrevocability and 
transparency.  
The Islamic banking industry could benefit greatly from blockchain technology and smart 
contracts in its efforts to provide services in the true spirit of Shariah-compliance. 
Contributors could provide funds to the bank (agents) via smart contracts, and the bank could 
in turn fulfil its accountability responsibilities to its contributors and benefeciairies by using 
smart contracts, although it is under no obligation to do so (Figure 3). The conditions of the 
Shariah and the contractual agreement could be coded into smart contracts that perform as per 
written guidelines to adhere to the tenets of Islamic principles in transacting. 
An Islamic bank could also solicit user feedback on the level and quality of service provision.  
As beneficiaries receive services and have the right to be involved in decisions that affect 
their daily lives, their involvement might provide management with valuable knowledge on 
the effectiveness of service provision.  Many board and management members, however, 
resist any suggestion of beneficiary feedback.  Islamic banks are also obliged to comply with 
government legislation that often involves reports to a special regulator, with the regulator’s 
power varying from one jurisdiction to the next.  Usually, Islamic banks must produce annual 
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reports and other information, as well as being subject to further investigation if the regulator 
deems it necessary.   
Many unanswered questions remain regarding the monitoring process, but one objective 
would be to determine whether management (the agent) acts in the best interests of the 
contributors and beneficiaries.  One of the biggest challenges of the future is to measure the 
social return on investment (SROI) of an agent’s interventions.  
9. Implementing a smart contract monitoring process 
Smart contracts are usable for all financial dealings between agents and stakeholders. They 
would provide both a mechanism to enforce adherence to the Shariah and an auditable record 
of all financial transactions taking place through the smart contract. The process of regulation 
and monitoring would be reduced to writing a smart contract that executes in line with the 
desired principles. Verifiable annual reports could be produced at any stage of the banking 
process or time of the year, and any form of investigation could easily be conducted through a 
review of the ledger in the blockchain.  
However, a few issues need to be tackled before smart contracts can be used to revolutionise 
and revamp the banking industry to provide users with trustworthy Shariah-compliant 
products and services. The primary issue is legal recognition: smart contracts are not presently 
legally binding, hence any redressal of complaints would not be handled in a court of law. 
Legal enforcement of a smart contract is also different. As stated in Raskin (2017) in the 
Georgetown Law Technology Review: “The typical legal action for breach of contract 
involves an aggrieved party going to a court of law or equity to demand money damages, 
restitution, or specific performance. With a smart contract, the aggrieved party will need to 
go to the court to remedy a contract that has already been executed or is in the process of 
being performed. This is because, by definition, a strong smart contract is already executed 
or in the process of being executed by the time the court hears the case. So the remedy must 
come after the fact to undo or alter the agreement in some way.” However, the State of 
Arizona recently passed a bill that gives legal status to smart contracts and blockchain-based 
signatures, setting a precedent for others to follow. The implications of the bill is that 
Ethereum (an open-source, blockchain-based platform) will be treated as a beneficial 
invention for mainstream usage by legislators and regulators, where both the Ethereum-based 
smart contracts and blockchain-based signatures will be treated the same way as any ordinary 
contract or signature.  
Smart contracts can be implemented in the banking industry in various ways depending on the 
requirement of the organisation in question. A bank such as IBBL, for instance, could protect 
itself from grievances by having a smart contract implement a voting mechanism for the 
election of any board member. The person voting would not need to be physically present in 
that situation, and the votes submitted by all shareholders through the smart contract could be 
produced to resolve any potential disputes regarding the election. A Capgemini Consulting 
paper entitled “Smart Contracts in Financial Services: Getting from Hype to Reality” 
(October 2016) states that: “Smart contracts, enabled by blockchain or distributed ledgers, 
have been held up as a cure for many of the problems associated with traditional financial 
contracts, which are simply not geared up for the digital age. Reliance on physical documents 
leads to delays, inefficiencies and increases exposures to errors and fraud. Financial 
intermediaries, while providing interoperability for the finance system and reducing risk, 
create overhead costs for and increase compliance requirements.” In view of the many 
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advantages offered by smart contracts, other governments can be expected to follow 
Arizona’s example and legalise them. 
In addition to the issue of legal recognition, another equally important issue is that neither the 
agents nor the stakeholders understand the code in the smart contract, and both rely on the 
programmers’ interpretation. From a legal and Shariah point of view, however, this blind 
reliance on the programmer is not is not wise for either party. One solution would be to have a 
programmer for each transacting party act as the interpreter for the legal representative before 
the agent and stakeholder mutually agree to deploy the smart contract. This interim approach 
could be used to provide direct encoding of written legal contractual agreements into smart 
contract code until such time as the technology has matured.  
Another legal adherence issue relates to the legal validity of the smart contracts in all the 
transacting regions. Laws differ from one country to another and as such, an agent would 
need to customize the smart contract to the laws of the land, and have different versions of the 
smart contract in the blockchain, much as a bank has different branches in different countries. 
The process might seem complicated, but it is much simpler than the existing infrastructure. 
Each agent (bank) could have a single smart contract reflecting the laws of the country in 
question rather than having multiple branches in that country. This would lead to a reduction 
in office space requirements, number of employees, electricity consumption and other 
associated resources related to operational and maintenance expenses. In order to resolve the 
issue of conflicts between contractual agreements in the Islamic finance industry, an 
international organisation like the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) could be set up to provide standard templates of smart 
contracts catering to different Shariah-compliant contracts, namely ISIFSC (International 
Standards for Islamic Financial Smart Contracts), as conceptualised in Figure 4. 
Once the initial base is set, agents could customise it further within the realm of the Shariah to 
provide the functionality required by their organisational infrastructure. That would provide 
uniformity, reduce the overhead required for programmers to code a smart contract from 
scratch each time an agent wants a contract deployed on the blockchain for a particular 
Shariah-compliant contract, and increase trust, while providing both transparency and a 
speedy solution for the execution of any transaction. In the above scenario, monitoring would 
involve checking the smart contract code to verify its functionality, accuracy and adherence to 
the Shariah. As a post-inspection event, verification of the investigation could be obtained in 
written form from the blockchain ledger. In the event of non-conformance of any smart 
contract, the specific smart contract could be ‘killed’ and the resulting data saved as a 
template that did not work appropriately, leading to updating of the template in the 
international organisation, or in the agent if the fault was at that level. 
A very good blending of skills from the financial, technological and academic sectors is 
required to implement a blockchain-based monitoring system at Islamic banks. Continuous 
inter-sector communication at the time of standardisation and later during customisation of 
the smart contracts at the bank level would be essential for a successful Shariah-compliant 
banking platform. 
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10. Conclusion 
The research team’s first challenge was to encapsulate the ingredients of a theoretical 
business model despite the opacity of the Islamic banking sector.  The model offers a better 
explanation of the complex structures, processes and practices of organizations in that sector.  
The article casts new light on the interactions among contributors, agents, regulators and 
beneficiaries, and offers the researcher a plethora of new research avenues: How do Islamic 
banks create value and what is their social impact?  Who are the principals in an Islamic 
bank?  Are the regulators too indulgent with delinquent banks?  Should the state assign 
forensic accountants a more important role?  How will smart contracts and blockchain 
technology transform Islamic banking? How can smart contracts be made legally binding? 
How can automatic encoding of human readable legal contracts be put into machine-readable 
smart contracts? Can blockchain technology be scaled to handle the current transaction rate of 
a standard Islamic bank? Another important follow-up research question relates to the 
governance of funds: in-depth organisational case studies based on interviews of boards of 
directors could be an effective alternative method for assessing field interventions and 
measuring the social impact of Islamic banking.  A candid question: Should beneficiaries or 
users be involved in the measurement of the efficiency and effectiveness of an agent’s 
performance? 
In the Tragedy of Hamlet, Marcellus says to Horatio: ‘Something is rotten in the state of 
Denmark.’  Was something rotten in the Islami Bank of Bengladesh?  In the coming decades, 
poor governance could severely undermine confidence in the sector, which would damage 
social welfare and economic development. Blockchain technology and smart contracts could 
be strategic tools for the guidance and monitoring of Islamic banks. 
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ANNEX   FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: The Traditional Monitoring Process 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Exploring Islamic Banking using the Complexity Matrix 
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Figure 3: Towards a Blockchain Monitoring Process 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Monitoring the Islamic Finance Industry 
 
 
 
The source of the icons used in the figure is https://www.flaticon.com/. 
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